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Special Comment
By DANIEL L. GNSBERG* AND STEVEN M. STEIN
DUE PROCESS
AND
THE TAX COURT
I. THE "CHOICE" OF FORUMS
Whatever happened to the doctrine of the separation of
powers? It is no secret that in modem times there has been an
increased fusion of judicial, legislative and executive powers in
the "headless fourth branch of government-the administrative
agencies. We are told that this has come about through necessity
-civilization is increasingly complex and there is an increasing
need for a large but efficient government. That statement has
been mouthed so often, by so many people, that it has almost
become a shibboleth.
Well, there is at least one instance of fusion of powers for
which the standard "justification" could not be more inapposite.
If that particular organization does not exist in violation of the
constitutional theory of separation of powers, then there is no
such theory. That organization is the United States Tax Court.
It performs the same functions and exists for the same reason
as the regular district courts. It is called an "independent agency
within the executive branch of government." The only thing that
makes it an agency in the executive branch of the government
is the fact that it is not independent.
A taxpayer, if he wishes to contest a determination of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, may bring his action in a
court or an agency. There is, however, one difference: if he wants
to go into court he must first pay the entire amount which the
Commissioner alleges to be due.' Theoretically, the taxpayer gets
the same kind of hearing whether he sues in the District Court
or the Tax "Court". But what are the facts?
* L.L.B., University of Miami; member, Florida Bar.
'Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
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The first fact is that in the Tax Court the government wins
approximately four cases out of five; in the district courts (and
the Court of Claims) it wins one case out of two.2 In addition,
the Tax Court follows the District Court Rules of District of
Columbia, whereas the district courts follow the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. No discovery procedure as a matter of right
is available in the Tax Court; discovery procedures are available
in the district courts. The Tax Court permits no jury trial; the
district courts do. The rules of the Tax Court permit oral argu-
ment only at the discretion of the judge; oral argument is per-
mitted freely in the district courts.3 The Tax Court is a tribunal
of limited jurisdiction; the district courts are possessed of broad
"unwritten" or common law powers.
4
If the federal government could not afford to allow people to
sue in regular Article III courts before paying the alleged tax,
there might be some justification for the present establishment.
In fact, however, litigation in the Tax Court takes the same length
of time as litigation in the district courts. One is led to believe
that it is the Tax Court's decisions, themselves, not the time it
takes to get those decisions, that provides the pressure for keeping
the Tax Court in the executive branch of government.
Few would argue that there is an inequity here. The question
is whether this inequity can be resolved by the courts. Congress
has established a vast network of procedural obstacles in the
path of one who would challenge the constitutionality of the Tax
Court. At least, the administrative gloss which has been put
on these congressional enactments has that effect. Furthermore,
even if these obstacles could be surmounted, the taxpayer is faced
with an obsolescent or misapplied theory that one does not have
a constitutional right to a judicial hearing before the tax has been
paid. That theory is "misapplied" because, even if it were correct,
it would provide no justification for the present system, which
"See Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1962 and 1963.
United States Government Printing Office.
3 Section 7435, Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
The proceedings of the Tax Court and its divisions shall be conducted
in accordance with such rules of practice and procedure (other than
rules of evidence) as the Tax Court may prescribe and in accordance
with the rules of evidence applicable in trials without jury in the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia.
4 See Lasky v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam,
352 U.S. 1027 (1957).
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has the effect of discriminating between the rich and the poor.
(The wealthy taxpayer is much more likely to be in a position to
pay first and litigate later than is the poor taxpayer.)
Even if the government is not absolutely required to afford
the populace a certain remedy, it does not follow that the govern-
ment may extend that remedy to some and arbitrarily withhold
it from others. Moreover, it also does not follow that the procedure
which has been established is a permissible breach of the doctrine
of separation of powers. Let us take for example a hypothetical
analogy:
Once an indictment, charging a criminal offense, has been
returned against an individual he has an undeniable right to a
judicial hearing on the questions of his innocence or guilt. Let us
assume, however, that Congress has attempted to establish the
following procedure. First it creates an elaborate apparatus called
"pre-indictment procedure." If the Attorney General (or his
delegate) believes that an indictment should issue, he issues it-
but not in final form. He gives the person charged ninety days to
petition to a "Court of Justice", an independent agency within
the executive branch of government. No one is forced to petition
to the Justice Court in any case; it is merely an additional
administrative remedy.
Of course, for one to take this remedy there must be some
financial inducement, as there is in the Tax Court situation. So
let us further assume that in the "Court of Justice" all counsel fees
and all other costs are paid by the government. (In regular
courts only the indigent are entitled to counsel free of charge;
thus the proposed system would be an "advantage" to the person
for whom paying an attorney is not an absolute impossibility,
but only a great inconvenience.) And-oh, yes-there is one con-
dition upon all this. If a person accepts the new remedy he waives
his right to a hearing in an Article III court.5
One recognizes immediately that there is a serious constitu-
tional vice in all this, but superficially it is difficult to put one's
finger on it. After all, the choice is completely voluntarily. Every
one who wants it may still have his Article III hearing.
5 In the case of the Tax Court, Section 7482 of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that the Courts of Appeals have sole review of the decisions of the Tax
Court.
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To come to the heart of the matter, the evil is this. The body
politic becomes lulled into a false sense of security. Assume that
for twenty or thirty years this "Court of Justice" had a record
that was exemplary. The government had no better or no worse
chance than it did in the regular courts. At the end of this thirty-
year period the general attitude of the public, and even of the
Bar, will have overcome an almost imperceptible but nevertheless
substantial change. Courts are no universal boon to mankind;
they are expensive; they follow outmoded procedures; their
judges hear all manner of cases and generally lack expertise in
criminal matters.
In the meantime, there has also been a perhaps imperceptible
change in current criminal jurisprudence. The "Court of Justice"
has been carefully "integrating" the criminal law in order to make
a more "coherent" policy. Since it is a "national" court it is not
obligated to follow the law declared by the various circuits." It
establishes its own rules of decision, and coincidently, the govern-
ment finds it easier and still easier to win cases.
What happens next? Well, one possibility is that attorneys
will be wise enough to see what is happening and courageous
enough to advise their clients that, in spite of the additional
expense, they should stand for trial in the district courts. We
say "courageous enough" because if it happens that the client wins
he may be firmly convinced that he would have won anyway;
and if he loses in the district court he may well blame his attorney
for the additional and apparently wasted expenditures.
Another possibility is that attorneys will not be that wise or
that courageous. A third possibility is that some one may find
his way through the procedural quagmire and governmental
arrogance (which says, "If you don't like our Court, don't use it.")
and attack the whole thing at its roots.
Which brings us up to date. There is one major difference,
however, between the actual Tax Court and the hypothetical
"Court of Justice." In the latter case the only remedy would be
to disestablish the whole thing, since the government could not
be expected to foot the legal fees for everyone. As for the Tax
3 This is the parallel position taken by the Tax Court. See A. L. Lawrence,
27 T.C. 713 (1957).
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Court the solution would be much simpler, since it is entirely
within the realm of possibility for the government to allow those
who so desire, to litigate their tax claims before payment is made.
In a recent year the total volume of litigation before the Tax
Court was approximately $900,000,000.00. That before all the
district courts and the Court of Claims was approximately
$450,000,000.00." The total revenue for that year was in the
neighborhood of $80,000,000,000.00. Thus, if everyone were
allowed to litigate his tax claim prior to payment it would have
meant a "delay" in obtaining revenue for that year of less than
one-half of one percent of the total amount taken in. Needless to
say, frivolous claims which were obviously interposed solely for
the purpose of delay could be summarily dismissed in any event.
This procedure has been used in the Federal Courts for many
years.
Thus, while we will assume, arguendo, that one does not have
an absolute right to a judicial hearing before the fall tax has been
paid, nevertheless that right, such as it is, may not be withheld
on an arbitrary basis. In the case of United States, ex rel Accardi
v. Shaughnessy,8 the Supreme Court held that although one does
not have a constitutional right to a hearing on a revocation of
the suspension of a deportation order, the revocation can never-
theless not be made arbitrarily. We assert that in the instant
case the withholding of a right to a judicial hearing is an arbitrary
refusal. The stated ground for the refusal is the government's
need for a speedy revenue collection procedure. First of all,
there is doubt as to the reality of that need. Secondly, it is quite
clear that the Tax Court could not fiuffll it in any case.
The parallel between the Tax Court and the hypothetical
"Court of Justice" is not contrived. The Tax Court offers a dif-
ferent financial inducement but it is every bit as real. And the
irony is this: the more unexpected the government's additional
assessment, the more difficult it is likely to be for the taxpayer to
obtain the money and sue in the district court. Furthermore, it
is not unreasonable to assume that a totally unexpected additional
demand on the part of the Commissioner is the one that is most
likely to be without sound legal basis. After all, if the taxpayer
7 See Flora v. United States, supra note 1 at 175.
8347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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were anticipating an additional assessment he probably knew he
had been acting pursuant to a provision of the Internal Revenue
Code susceptible of more than one interpretation. But the un-
anticipated deficiency is quite likely to be based on a novel
reading of the statute.
One might object to the above analogy on the ground that
the "Court of Justice" dealt with matters of liberty rather than
property. In fact, we assumed such a tribunal for precisely that
reason. The distinction between liberty and property is one of
the most unfortunate aspects of mid-century jurisprudence. There
is still a tendency to over-react to the excesses of the 1920's and
1930's. That certain rights should have a "preferred position"
sounds very nice, superficially, but there cannot be preferred
positions unless there are also subordinate ones. There was no
such distinction in the Declaration of Independence-the point
was simply that:
He has made Judges dependent on his will alone, for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.
The charge levelled here against the Tax Court is by no
means an indictment of all administrative agencies. The Tax
Court should never have been an administrative agency. It does
not do the work of administrative agencies. It has no deliberately
broad legislative mandate to make policy. As the Tax Court
itself has stated:
Whatever label might be used to characterize this Court for
various purposes, its procedures are and were intended by
Congress to be in every sense of the word, judicial .... We
hear and decide only real controversies between adverse
parties, following procedures which are inherently judicial.
We make no independent investigation of the facts as do some
agencies labeled "administrative," either upon our own motion
or upon the motion of one of the parties; our findings of fact
are based solely on evidence submitted to us by the parties
in accordance with prescribed rules.
We do not appear as parties in Court to enforce our orders
or the law as do so-called administrative agencies. Our find-
ings of fact carry the same weight as made by a District Court
sitting without a jury.9
9 Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1377, 1384-85 (1954).
1965]
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In a sense the Tax Court's position is something of an over-
statement. The Tax Court is not really a judicial body since it
lacks the essential safeguards pertaining thereto. But the negative
aspect of the Tax Court's remarks is well taken. This tribunal
is certainly no administrative agency-in the normal sense of the
term. Indeed, if the Tax Court were to be taken out of the
executive branch it would in the long run strengthen that branch
of government as much as it would strengthen the judicial branch.
That which clarifies the nature of the judicial power must, since
it is the opposite side of the coin, clarify and strengthen the
administrative power-but strengthen it for the good of the na-
tion, not for some small group.
II. THE PROCEDURAL QUAGMIRE
Basically, there are two ways in which a taxpayer could
attempt to raise the constitutional questions referred to above.
He could bring an action to enjoin a Tax Court proceeding or he
could bring a suit in the district court without first paying the tax.
A. The Injunction Route
If he seeks an injunction, the taxpayer is, at the outset, in the
unenviable position of appearing to be enjoining himself. After
all, the government would claim, it was the taxpayer who in-
stituted the action in the Tax Court in the first place. Shouldn't
he be estopped from enjoining the procedure which he himself
set in motion? The answer, of course, is no. Only one who is
naive or disingenuous could argue that the taxpayer has in any
realistic sense initiated the proceeding. What choice had he?
If the taxpayer had failed to petition to the Tax Court then he
had not "exhausted his administrative remedies." Yet here is the
irony of the situation: while he is in the process of exhausting his
administrative remedies, he is, by statute, forfeiting his judicial
remedies!
But if this application of the doctrine of "exhausting adminis-
trative remedies" proves unacceptable, the government has, per-
haps, other offerings. It may contest the jurisdiction of the
district court (wherein the injunction suit is brought) on these
grounds:
1. The anti-injunction statute-Section 7421(a) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
[Vol. 58,
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2. The anti-declaratory judgment statute-Section 2201 of the
Judicial Code.
8. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity.
4. The exclusivity of the Tax Court's jurisdiction once a
petition has been filed-Section 6512 of the Internal Revenue
Code.
We -ill demonstrate the weaknesses of these contentions in
the following paragraphs.
1. The Anti-Injunction Statute
Section 7421(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
Except as provided in sections 6212(a) and (c), and 6213(a),
no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or col-
lection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.
Though superficially this provision creates difficulty, a close
examination of this statute shows that it is not applicable. A suit
to enjoin the Tax Court would not in actuality have the effect of
restraining an assessment of any tax. The assessment could be
finalized, constitutionally, by an administrative procedure; the
Tax Court suit does more than finalize the assessment. In addi-
tion, it bars the taxpayer from litigating de novo in a district
court.1" Thus, the taxpayer's injunction suit could merely seek
to bar the entry of a Tax Court decree that would have res
judicata effect.
There is a more fundamental reason, however, why Section
7421(a) would not apply. The statute was designed originally
to prevent the remedy of injunction against the assessment of
taxes, so that litigation over tax disputes could be channeled into
a particular agency. But here, the taxpayer would be attacking
the very validity of that agency. Therefore, any statute which
was a part of the entire scheme of channeling tax disputes into
the Tax Court could become subject to the same attack. To put
the matter another way, the purpose of Section 7421(a) is to
prevent the circunvention of constitutional channels. But here
the allegation is that the very channel itself is unconstitutional.
But, it should not be necessary for the taxpayer to go so far
as to contest the constitutionality of Section 7421(a). It is true
that the congressional purpose included the prevention of re-
10 See, note 5 supra.
1965]
KENTUcKY LAW Jou[NAL
straining assessments even of those taxes about which there
might be a constitutional question." However, if it is clear that
what is involved is not a tax but rather a penalty or something
else in the guise of a tax, the statute does not apply.'2 A fortiori,
if the suit raises questions involving not taxes but the constitu-
tionality of certain procedures, the statute is not intended to
apply. And here, it is evident that the constitutional questions
being raised involve taxation only incidentally. As the analogy in
Part I relating to a "Court of Justice" has shown, the constitutional
evil involved here would arise whatever the actual subject matter
of the "administrative suits" happened to be.
2. The Anti-Declaratory Judgment Statute
In general, the same factors that prevent the applicability of
Section 7421(a) also render inapplicable Section 2201. Once
again the congressional purpose in withholding declaratory relief
with respect to federal taxes was to prevent the circumvention
of the Tax Court. Once again this is the very tribunal which is
under attack. There would be no intention in the injunction suit
to merely avoid Tax Court litigation in this particular case. If the
taxpayer's contention is correct, then the principal purpose of
Section 2201 no longer exists; if the taxpayer's contention is incor-
rect, then Section 2201 continues as an effective bar to the circum-
vention of the Tax Court.
In the situation wherein declaratory relief would normally be
sought, it is evident that Congress has established an adequate
alternative remedy. The classic situation wherein Section 2201
would be invoked is the case in which a taxpayer claims a par-
ticular tax is not constitutional. Congress has deemed that such
a claim is more properly adjudicated in the context of the entire
tax suit. In the instant case the question which is being raised
has nothing to do with substantive tax matters. In short, what-
ever purpose one logically imputes to Congress in enacting Sec-
tion 2201, it should not be held as a bar to this kind of case.
It is doubtful that the taxpayer would be seeking declaratory
relief in any event. It may be true that on a purely semantic level
11 Enochs v. Williams Packing Company, 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
12 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Miller v. Standard Nut Margerine,
284 U.S. 498 (1932).
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he seeks a "declaration" that the Tax Court in its present form
is unconstitutional, but the suit is really instituted to discon-
tinue a proceeding that is already taking place. Some might argue
that if the district court's decree were entered before final action
had been taken by the Tax Court, the effect of the district court's
action would be to render a "declaratory" judgment. But it is a
very novel theory of law to identify the nature of relief sought by
the time of the entry of a decree. In fine, if the government were
to claim the applicability of Section 2201, it would be introducing
a red herring.
3. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
In all probability, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
would, additionally, claim that the taxpayer's suit is barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is, after all, not unusual
to run into this claim in any kind of litigation against the govern-
ment.
However, there are several defects in such a claim. In the
first place all of the taxpayer's contentions would be based on
claims of unconstitutionality. In the leading case on the subject
of sovereign immunity, Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corpora-
tion,13 the Supreme Court clearly implied that cases claiming
unconstitutionality raised separate considerations:
But in the absence of a claim of constitutional limitation the
necessity of permitting the government to carry out its func-
tions ... outweigh the possible disadvantage to the citizen.
... 14 [Emphasis added]
More specifically, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has had
principal application to two areas of dispute-neither of which is
involved in this kind of law suit. Those areas are enforcement
of contract and equitable claims against government property.
Moreover, governmental immunity has been held to be properly
pleaded where an individual has sought affirmative action against
an individual in his official, rather than his personal, capacity.
That part of the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be a bit
metaphysical; if there is any valid generalization it would be
more along the lines of footnote 11 in the Larson opinion:
13 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
14 Ibid.
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Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even
if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted uncon-
stitutionally or beyond his statutory power, if the relief cannot
be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct
complained of but will require affirmative action by the
sovereign .... 15
The differentiation between affirmative action and mere ces-
sation is, in itself, somewhat conceptualistic. (The "affirmative
action" is generally some kind of payment or relinquishment.)
But at least insofar as the injunction suit in the district court is
concerned, it is evident that applying the "affirmative-mere
cessation" distinction would result in a defeat of the government's
claim of sovereign immunity. This is as it should be. The crux
of the taxpayer's complaint is that a portion of the revenue
collection procedure is unconstitutional. If claims of unconstitu-
tionality could be raised only at the will of the Department of
Justice or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the doctrine of
judicial review would have lost most of its vitality.
4. The Exclusivity of the Tax Court's Jurisdiction
Section 6512 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that
once a petition has been filed with the Tax Court, no suit for the
refund of any income tax may be maintained for the same taxable
year in the district court. In truth, this provision ought to have
no bearing on this kind of law suit whatsoever. Once again, the
government's theory in asserting this position would be that the
district court injunction suit has a direct effect on the substantive
tax matters at issue. Of course, the suit would have no such
effect, since the only points at issue would involve the legality
of certain revenue collecting procedures.
B. The Original Suit in the District Court
Another approach would be for the taxpayer to bring an
action, without having first paid his tax, in the district court. His
theory would be that he is without other constitutional remedy
for contesting the legality of the tax in question.
In a sense there would be fewer procedural entanglements in
such an approach. But the direct bar of Section 7422(a) of the
15 Id. at 691. See also Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sover-
eign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 29-36 (1963).
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Internal Revenue Code would be immediately asserted. In Flora
v. United States this provision was held to mean that all of the
tax in question for that year must be first paid. Thus, the Court
held in that case an individual who had paid as much of the tax
as he could (approximately four-fifths of it) was not allowed to
sue for a refund of that amount. Not having petitioned to the
Tax Court in the required time, the taxpayer was also unable to
pursue that remedy. This harsh result, a 5-4 decision, was based
on a long history of requiring taxpayers to first pay the amount
in question before instituting litigation. Even so, there were
many cases in which it was not insisted that the entire tax be
paid; in fact, the government's erroneous statement to the con-
trary afforded a basis for a rehearing of the Flora case. But in the
rehearing the majority maintained its original position.
That, then, is the background with which the taxpayer would
be faced were he to institute an original suit in the district court.
The new matter that the taxpayer could add would be the
constitutional dimension. He could make a broadside attack on
the entire theory of "pay first, sue later" or he could adopt one of
several more restrictive theories which will be examined below.
The point which we wanted to make here is that while the
taxpayer has an easier procedural route in an original action in
the district court, at the same time his substantive problems may
be greater. In the injunction suit the taxpayer could at least
argue that while there may be no automatic right to a suit in
the district court, nevertheless the Tax Court is unconstitutional
as being in violation of the separation of powers. In the original
district court action he must show some kind of a right to a
hearing before the tax has been paid.
III. THE REMEDIES
As suggested above, this problem comes dangerously near to
being one of those cases in which there is a clear cut constitu-
tional evil with no means of raising the issue. We say it comes
dangerously near to being that kind of a case, but in fact there
are several theories available to the taxpayer.
A. An Administrative Agency Holding Itself Out as a Court
Consider the matter first from the standpoint of the taxpayer
seeking to enjoin the Tax Court. Certainly it is true that the
1965]
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taxpayer was not absolutely forced to go into the Tax Court in
the first place. Yet, at the same time, it ill lies in the Commis-
sioner's mouth to say that the taxpayer had complete freedom of
choice. If the taxpayer really knew all along that his entire pur-
pose in petitioning to the Tax Court was only to later seek to
enjoin that same proceeding, it still does not follow that his rights
were not infringed. After all, when a taxpayer institutes a refund
suit the government hardly could argue, "You can't sue for a
refund-you shouldn't have paid the tax in the first place." It is
true that the refund suit is specifically provided by statute. How-
ever, this procedure was also known at the common law.
Moreover, it is not correct to assume that the taxpayer's
petition to the Tax Court was merely a matter of going through
the motions. It is equally consistent with reality to assume that
a taxpayer petitioned to the Tax Court under a mistaken belief
that he was going to receive a full judicial hearing. After all, he
would not be the first to be somewhat confused as to the nature
of this tribunal:
The Tax Court of the United States is already a court in both
name and fact .... 16
2. Harold M. Stephens, former Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit:
The Tax Court has become a Court in every proper sense of
the term.'
7
3. Albert B. Maris, Chief Judge of the United States Court
of Appeals, 3rd Circuit:
The Tax Court for many years has been conducted in all
practical respects as a Court.'8
4. The Tax Court:
Whatever label might be used to characterize this Court for
various purposes its procedures are and were intended by
Congress to be in every sense of the word, judicial .... 19
5. Judge Murdock, Chief Judge of the Tax Court:
16 80 Cong. Rec. 8679 (1934).
17 Hearings before Senate Subcommittee,, see 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 619
(1956).
18 ibid.
39 Fairmont Aluminum Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
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I think we should get away from the tag of 'independent
agency in the executive branch of government' because that is
misleading. I think we have risen above it. It is misleading
and at times it is embarrassing.
20
6. Notice sent by United States Treasury Department with
the ninety-day letter:
The Tax Court of the United States is in no way connected
with the Internal Revenue Service or the Treasury Depart-
ment.
7. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure:
... a court in all but name.21
Of course, a taxpayer can blame only himself if he is unaware
of the fact that Tax Court judges are not appointed to serve
during good behavior.22 But he could hardly be expected to
know that the government's record is considerably better in the
Tax Court than it is in the district courts. Similarly he could
hardly be expected to know that the Tax Court does not believe
itself to be bound by the decisions of the courts of appeals.
On the contrary, everything possible is done to convince the
taxpayer that the Tax Court is in all respects the equivalent of the
district courts. In the notice of appeal referred to above, the
phrase "Tax Court" is mentioned seven times in three short
sentences. Nowhere in any of the letters put out by the Treasury
Department is there a suggestion that some difference exists
between the Tax Court and the district court remedies. Certainly
the government is well aware that a hearing before an Article III
judge can be an important advantage and one that it will be the
first to protect if it can do so. In the recent case of Wells v. United
States,23 the government successfully challenged the jurisdiction
of a district court in the Canal Zone in a tax refund suit. It was
held that jurisdiction did not lie because the Canal Zone court is
not an Article III Court and hence was not authorized by statute
to hear this kind of case.
20 Hearings before House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 1959.
21 See 24 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 619 (1956).
22 UNTERNAL REvENuE coDE OF 1954, § 7443.
23214 F.2d 380 (1954).
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In part, what has happened is this: the labels "Court" and
"judges", through a long history of constitutional practice, have
acquired a certain aura-an aura which suggests independence.
(The Court of Claims-even when it was still considered a non-
Article III court-was certainly not considered to be within the
executive branch of government. Finally the Supreme Court held
that it really was an Article III court, in any event.24 Indeed, to do
otherwise would have suggested a power in Congress to establish
permanent judicial bodies with no guarantees of independence.
That power does not appear, expressly or impliedly, in the
Constitution.) These labels have now been ascribed to an
institution which does not deserve them.
The taxpayer is further misled into accepting the Tax Court
remedy. He may well be unaware that the remedy is substitutive
rather than additional. In other words if he is under the impres-
sion that the Tax Court is an administrative agency he will very
likely assume that the courts of appeals exercise considerable
control over the Tax Court. In fact, however, the Tax Court
may well decline to follow the rule of law established in the
taxpayer's circuit. Had the taxpayer gone into a district court he
could have expected a decision in his favor (assuming the ap-
plicable law was in his favor) without having to take an appeal.
If instead he goes into the Tax Court he then loses his right to go
to the district court and is indeed forced to appeal the decision.
Admittedly the last mentioned situation involved two separate
factors: (1) the res judicata effect of a Tax Court decision, and
(2) the Tax Court's attitude toward the courts of appeals. But
this is a realistic presentation of the problem. The various dis-
advantages involved in Tax Court litigation do not present them-
selves singly and do not stand out. It is not necessary to
determine which of the various disadvantages to the taxpayer
who is forced to go into the Tax Court would be enough to create
a constitutional vice. It is sufficient to say that all these factors
in the aggregate add up to a discrimination between those tax-
payers who can afford to first pay the tax and those who cannot.
Nor is it merely a question of the taxpayer's being misled. In
a sense he may realize that the Tax Court remedy is an inferior
24 Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
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one. At the same time, however, if he neither has the money to
pay the tax nor any reasonable prospect of obtaining the money
(and he needs every cent of the alleged deficiency), it is highly
unlikely that he will not grasp at every straw. In other words,
there is tremendous power in the hands of the government in this
situation. There is great psychological pressure upon the taxpayer
to use a designated channel.
In spite of all this the government would still claim that
the existence of the Tax Court deprives no one of any rights. Are
the pressures referred to above too nebulous to be made the basis
of a law suit? Here, it becomes impossible not to look at the other
side of the coin. Just what are the constitutional rights of the
aggrieved taxpayer?
B. The Right to an Available Judicial Remedy
The classical remedies were the suit for a refund and the suit
to enjoin in assessment. When refund suits were barred by act of
Congress, that act was held constitutional because the other
remedy presumably still existed, Cary v. Curtis.25 Later the re-
fund suit was reinstated and the injunction suit was barred. Since
that time, the refund suit has always existed; Congress has never
attempted to bar both that and the injunction suit. Well, then,
what is the status of the refund suit-is it really an available
alternative remedy? It would be an understatement to say that
the situation has changed radically since the decision of Cary v.
Curtis. Consider these differences:
1. Today, taxes take a much higher proportion of the indi-
vidual's income. (Indeed, most taxes a century ago were property
taxes, and were comparatively small.) Thus there is a greater
likelihood that regardless of his status-the individual will find
himself unable to pay.
2. Today by far the most important tax is the income tax.
In other words, the tax bears a proportion to an individual's
income for a particular period. Thus, even though he may be
making more money at a particular time it will be at that same
time that he would be faced with a large tax assessment.
3. If the Commissioner does contest the taxpayer's own assess-
2503 How. 236 (1845).
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ment, he is very likely to actually overstate the amount due, in
order to counter the taxpayer's presumed understatement. This
would make it that much more difficult to first pay the tax.
4. Today fraud penalties are assessed. These amount to
fifty percent of the alleged deficiency.
5. The length of time necessary to litigate the average tax
case has increased significantly in the last 100 years (especially
when it must be taken into account the time necessary to get the
case into Court. In urban areas there are frequently backlogs of
three to five years in the federal district courts.)
6. There has also been a vast increase in the expense of
litigating tax suits. (Thus even if one could pay the additional
assessment it is that much more unlikely that he would also have
funds left over to contest the claim and get his money back.)
The above factors indicate that the post-payment remedy is
not nearly so accessible to the individual taxpayer as it once was.
On the other hand there are also factors which indicate a decrease
in the government's need to limit taxpayers to a post-payment
remedy.
1. The income tax is premised on a self-assessment system.
The basic assumption of such a system is that the majority of
taxpayers will state their tax with a fair degree of objectivity.
Thus it is reasonable to assume that the proportion of disputed
claims would be less under such a system than in the case where
revenue agents made the original assessment.
2. Such a vast proportion of the national income is in the
public sector that the government cannot be hurt by minor delays
in obtaining revenue.
3. Modem economic science has developed to such a degree
that any harm caused by delays in obtaining revenue can be
easily foreseen. Such harm can be offset by adjusting the interest
rates on taxes allegedly due. (If it were true that the interest
rate on unpaid taxes would have to go up then what it means is
this: the poor are forced to forego a judicial remedy entirely, so
that the wealthy can pay six percent instead of seven percent
interest, should they ultimately lose their tax cases!)
In short, the refund suit used to be a fairly practical remedy
and one which the government could reasonably insist upon.
Today it is a practical remedy only for the wealthy man. This
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situation calls for a re-examination of the constitutionality barring
all suits before the tax has been paid. Such a re-examination is
warranted not because the Constitution has been changed but
because the facts, upon which a particular interpretation was
premised, have changed.
It is not necessary to go so far as to argue that the government
just always allow the taxpayer to litigate his prepayment claim
in an Article III court. Perhaps a compromise position is avail-
able. It may be constitutionally permissible for the government
to insist on payment first provided that it extends an adequate
administrative remedy that does not involve a forfeiture of the
right to a refund suit. Just as in the case of a hearing before the
Appellate Division of the Internal Revenue Service, a hearing
before the Tax Court could be a further administrative action. It
is even conceivable that either the Commissioner or the taxpayer
could institute a proceeding de novo in the district court if
unsatisfied with the decision. At first glance, this procedure would
have the effect of complicating the revenue collection system.
But it ought not to work out that way. It is logical to assume,
if the Tax Court followed the same statutory modes of proceeding
that it does today, that the realization that its rulings were subject
to the most extensive kind of review would have a healthy effect.
C. Special Situations
Furthermore, even if it be assumed that all taxpayers need
not be given the right to prepayment litigation, there are two
specific situations to which such a doctrine should surely apply.
These are civil fraud cases and cases involving insolvent tax-
payers.
1. Civil Fraud Cases
At the outset one should note this peculiarity relating to civil
fraud cases. Unlike other tax disputes, the burden of proving
civil fraud is on the Commissioner, not the taxpayer. This fact
assumes particular importance for the following reason: one of
the primary bases for the doctrine that the government did not
have to all prepayment suits was the fact that it had the power
of summary distraint. The power of summary distraint rests on
the theory that once a tax has been assessed it has the effect of a
judgment. There is, in other words, an automatic presumption
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that the Commissioner's determination is correct. Were this as-
sumption otherwise, then the notion of an assessment being the
same as a judgment makes very little sense, either in logic or in
law.
Thus, consider the matter in the posture of the normal civil
fraud case. Frequently these cases are instituted after the statute
of limitations would have run, but for the allegation of fraud.
So the only way that the Commissioner can get into Court is on
the basis of the fraud itself and, as stated, there is no presumption
that any fraud took place.
The constitutionality of the summary procedure was originally
upheld in 1856 in the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
and Improvement Company.26 That case, of course, involved no
questions of fraud. Its rationale depended on the presumption
of correctness doctrine. In its opinion the Court even went out
of its way to say:
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject we think it
proper to state that we do not consider Congress can either
withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from
its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law or in equity
or admiralty .... 27
Secondly, the fraud case is unique in that it is the only business
before the Tax Court which involves punitive action. By using
the term "punitive" we don't mean to be putting the rabbit in
the hat. Whether or not the civil fraud penalty is punitive in the
constitutional sense-and hence requires a determination by an
Article III court-is the question now to be examined.
Whether a particular action is "punitive" or remedial has long
been a vexing question and one to which the answers have not
always been uniform. There is a trend, however, toward con-
centrating more on the substance of the matter than on any
formal doctrinal basis. In a recent case, Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez,28 the Court states these factors as indicating whether
a particular action is a punishment or not:
1. Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint.
26 18 How. 272 (1855).
271d. at 284.
28 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
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2. Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment.
3. Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter.
4. Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence.
5. Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime.
6. Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it.2 9 Of the six factors which
Justice Goldberg listed in the Mendoza-Martinez case, four indis-
putably point to the civil fraud action as being punitive. Number
two, the historical view, is not decisive either way, the remedy
being so unique. Number six, the alternative purpose, raises a
factual question. The Commissioner has argued that the fifty
percent additional assessment is rationally designed to cover the
added expense in litigating such cases. No statistics have been
made available to prove this point. However, it seems a rather
tenuous basis when one considers that tax cases frequently involve
difficult valuation problems, arcane points of cost accounting, and
extensive factual inquiry. That there might be some extra
expense involved in fraud cases seems plausible; that such an
expense would come to anything like this fifty percent figure
seems grossly extravagant.
It must also be remembered that whether a particular action
is punitive in the constitutional sense must depend upon the
specific issue raised. What is punitive for one purpose certainly
may or may not be for another. Here, the term "punitive" is being
defined for the purpose of determining a litigant's right to a
hearing in an Article III court. Thus, a case like Helvering v.
Mitchell 30 would have very little precedential value. In that case
the Court held that an additional fraud assessment was not barred
by the fact that the defendant had already been acquitted on a
criminal indictment. In other words, the defendant could not
plead former jeopardy or res judicata. Specifically that case
turned on the fact that there were different burdens of proof
involved in the two proceedings. Certainly that is true. It is a
giant step to reason from this that the civil fraud proceeding is
constitutionally valid from an Article III standpoint. It is true,
29 Id. at 168, 169.
0 803 U.S. 391 (1938).
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as the court stated in the Mitchell case, that "determination of
the facts upon which liability is based may be by an administra-
tive agency.... ."31 It by no means follows that the kind of factual
inquiry which could be handled by an Article III court across the
street can necessarily be the basis of a finding of fraud liability.
Once again, we want to stress the admixture of considerations
which are involved here. An administrative finding of fraud in
itself certainly can raise constitutional problems. An administra-
tive finding of fraud which can be avoided by the wealthy but
not the poor involves far more serious constitutional questions.
2. Insolvency or Inability to Pay
We referred earlier to the Flora case, wherein the aggrieved
taxpayer was unable to pay the entire assessment. This is by no
means an unusual situation. Indeed, the stated reason for creating
the Tax Court in the first place was to relieve the hardship caused
by the pay first-litigate later doctrine. In other words, a great
many taxpayers are unable to avail themselves of the district court
remedy. In this posture let us look once again briefly at some of
the constitutional doctrine wherein the anti-injunction statutes
were upheld. Summary distraint in order to compel payment
was deemed to be proper, Springer v. United States,32 Phillips v.
Commissioner,' injunctions against the collection of a tax can be
forbidden, Snyder v. Marks.34 But all these decisions were based
on the assumption that the taxpayer had other remedies.3, In
Cary v. Curtis wherein the Court upheld the barring of refund
suits, the Court specifically states that:
He [the taxpayer] might have asserted his possession of the
goods .. .by replevin, . . . detinue .. .or trover ... The
legitimate inquiry before this court is not whether all right of
action has ben taken away from the party, and the court
responds to no such inquiry.3 6
It was never clear when any of these cases were decided
exactly what the taxpayer's alternative remedies were. Before
31 Ibid.
32102 U.S. 586 (1881).
33283 U.S. 589 (1931).
34 109 U.S. 189 (1883).
35 See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System,
314-15.
363 How. at 250.
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the time of Flora, in fact, there were several cases wherein tax-
payers were allowed to sue after having paid only part of the tax.
From a statutory standpoint in other words, it was not until 1961
that all alternative judicial remedies had effectively been taken
away. In the decision which created this situation the con-
stitutionality of this was not raised.
Of course, we are not dealing here with the situation regard-
ing jeopardy assessments or the like. Their constitutional validity
could depend easily enough on a concept of threatened wrong-
doing by the taxpayer. Even more neutrally, it could depend on
the mere danger to the government of a loss of revenue that can
be shown clearly and convincingly. But the case of jeopardy
assessment involves no performance on solely judicial acts by
administrative agencies and no "bribe" to the taxpayer to give up
his right to a judicial hearing. In the normal insolvency case it is
quite apparent that the taxpayer, having lost his ability to pay
and sue for a refund, has no alternative remedy. This might not
be so bad if he were protected in pursuing his administrative
remedies by at least having the possibility should he obtain funds
to later sue in a regular court. This choice is, of course, not open
to him.
IV. CONCLUSION
The development of the Tax Court and the asserted grounds
for its legitimacy show the danger in a static approach toward
constitutional law. (An approach, we might add, which is quite
untypical of the higher federal courts today.) Historically, there
is no constitutional right to litigate before paying the tax. This
was a good and a necessary rule. But look at what the rule has
produced. Today (long after the need for the government to
immediately obtain every last cent of its alleged revenue has
disappeared), the government has used this old rule as a lever-
a lever forcing people to litigate the majority of tax claims under
conditions favorable to the Commissioner and unfavorable to the
taxpayer. To make matters worse, it is the impecunious taxpayer
who bears the brunt of this abuse of power.
The difficult aspect of this problem is that it involves so many
separate points. Taken individually, one can seek to justify the
present existence of the Tax Court by invoking a number of small
rules and principles. Together these rules and principles simply
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do not add up. For example, nowhere can it be shown that the
government's need to obtain revenue can justify its establishing a
so-called independent tribunal which can say as follows:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue who has the duty of
administering the statutes of the United States throughout
the nation is required to apply these statutes uniformly as he
construes them. The Tax Court being a tribunal with national
jurisdiction over litigations involving the interpretation of
federal taxing statutes which may come to it from all parts
of the country has a similar obligation. .... 37 [Emphasis
added]
It is this sort of unconscious identification with the executive
department that has led the Tax Court to liken its duties to those
of the Commissioner, and adopt a cavalier attitude toward the
courts of appeals. (The above quote is from a case wherein the
Tax Court did not follow the rule of decision within that circuit.)
Were the Tax Court not within the executive department, then
almost surely it would identify not with the Commissioner but
with the district courts and follow the rules of decision which
were laid down.
If any one fundamental objection to the present procedure
had to be named it would be deprival of due process of law. As
we have stressed, there are also questions here of the taxing
power, the requirements of Article III, and the principles of
administrative law.38 But the principal question is one of fairness.
A constitutional rule that was applicable in 1845 or 1883 is not
applicable today. In 1845 there was great concern lest the
executive branch of government would be too weak. Today the
danger is that it be too strong. It is not likely that those who laid
down the rule that the taxpayer be required to first pay the tax
envisioned the present development-i.e., a situation where over
two-thirds of all income tax litigation is handled solely by the
executive department. We are not talking here about disputes
that are settled at the administrative level, the Appellate Division
of the Internal Revenue office. We are talking about law suits,
disputes which, once decided, are subject only to the review of
the Courts of Appeals.
37 A. L. Lawrence, supra note 6.
38 See Ginsberg, Is the Tax Court ConstitutionalP, 85 Miss. L. J., 882 (1964).
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This procedure tends toward an erosion of the independent
judiciary (for if a Tax Court, then why not a "Court of Justice");
it discriminates between the wealthy and the poor; and it deprives
a large segment of the population of an effective means of seeking
judicial redress. This procedure should be changed.
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